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Abstract 
Shareholder activism, primarily initiated by hedge funds, has given rise to numerous 
debates regarding value creation in targeted firms. Do activists compromise a firm’s 
long-term performance for short-term profits? Are they actively engaging in practices 
that impact operational efficiency? Is there evidence that activists are enhancing 
corporate governance and strategy? The answers to these questions can shape the 
economic, regulatory and political environments that investors face. This paper aims to 
assess the current activist landscape by considering both broad and specific activist 
tendencies brought forth by previous research. Despite management teams and media 
sources citing the value-destructive nature of activist intervention, academic research 
largely concludes the contrary. The majority of empirical evidence suggests these 
practices are not value-destructive, but typically value-accretive, at a statistically 
significant level. Finally, I suggest future research attempt to quantify the impact of 
activist-influenced mergers and acquisitions on the acquirer. 
*I would like to thank Jeffrey Hart for advising and giving me feedback throughout this project.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background & Inspiration 
My analysis is inspired by two items: personal exposure to activist campaigns 
and previous literature regarding shareholder activism. The goal of this paper is to 
utilize real-world experience to review previous literature that analyzes activist hedge 
funds. In a corporate setting I have researched activist tendencies, analyzed takeover 
defenses and interacted with tenured professionals. As academic researchers and 
corporate professionals are largely divided on the topic, I hope my tangible experience 
will offer a unique perspective. I aim to provide an objective, unbiased review of hedge 
fund activism.  
Shareholder activism has spurred discussion about the value of the tactic and its 
subsequent effect(s) on companies, investors and regulation. There are numerous policy 
debates, such as shareholder voting rights and SEC disclosure requirements that have 
resulted from such practices. Most importantly, there has been heated debate about 
value creation, or destruction, in targets. For these reasons, this research is vital in 
studying the true impact of activist interventions in targeted firms.  
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 analyzes the results of shareholder 
activism on the maximization of shareholder wealth. Section 3 reviews the impact to 
operating performance and efficiency. Section 4 looks at firm-wide corporate strategy, 
both in response to and in prevention of, activist intervention. The first three sections 
analyze data in both the short- and long-term. Section 5 provides a broad overview of 
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the analysis and concludes my findings. Lastly, Section 5 suggests that future avenues 
of research study the impact of activist-influenced mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on 
the acquirer. 
1.2 History of Activism  
 Research shows that activism came about in the 1980s due to an increase in 
institutional shareholdings that corresponded with an increase in corporate anti-
takeover provisions. So when institutions, and investors alike, were purchasing 
increasingly large quantities of shares, they were finding it increasingly difficult to 
influence firm performance. Academics argue that activism is a logical progression of 
shareholder monitoring in a market that is largely restrictive of such practices. Between 
1996 and 2005 there were 2,436 activist interventions at 548 different firms. A trend 
reversal has not been observed and funds have been targeting larger and larger firms 
over time. Approximately 24% of activist campaigns in 2012 targeted firms with more 
than $1 billion in market capitalization compared to just 8% in 2009 (Denes, Karpoff and 
McWilliams 2016).  
Investors such as Bill Ackman, Carl Icahn and Daniel Loeb have been increasing 
both the severity and frequency of interventions. With activist campaigns in companies 
as large as General Motors and Proctor & Gamble, no longer is activism a practice fit 
exclusively for small-cap, undervalued companies. Investors are taking active roles in 
major corporations that can affect a larger number of investors. 
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Regulation by the SEC, as per Section 13(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act, requires 
activists to file a Schedule 13D within 10 days of any “activist” investment. This applies 
to any such investor that acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5% of the 
outstanding shares of a public corporation. Additionally, there is a Schedule 13G that 
funds must file if their intentions of the investment are passive (i.e. they aren’t 
attempting to influence behavior). This distinction is important for analyzing the 
difference in outcomes arising from each specific investment type. The 13D / 13G 
database is the primary source of data for the research found throughout this literature 
review. 
This brief, yet intense, era of shareholder activism provides a broad sample of 
important research events. 
1.3 Long-Term Shareholder Wealth 
 Arguably the most important question that is asked about shareholder activism 
considers wealth creation. Do activists create wealth in the long-term? More specifically, 
is the myopic-activist claim true or false? Advocates of the myopic-activist claim 
suggest there is tangible degradation of shareholder wealth in the long-term in lieu of 
short-term gains. Empirical evidence across multiple studies supports the contrary. On 
balance, there is little evidence showing a meaningful decline in abnormal returns to 
targeted funds. This returns analysis is done typically by estimating an alpha for the 
targeted firm using techniques such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or the 
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (Fama-French-Carhart). This alpha, defined as 
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a cumulative abnormal return (CAR), then represents the excess, or abnormal, returns 
above what the model would suggest (Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang 2015). Additionally, 
multiple research articles have shown no reversal in stock price, and subsequent 
abnormal returns, for as long as five years post-intervention. However, there are 
number of critics who suggest these abnormal returns are product of competitive 
markets and a reversion to the mean rather than activist intervention. Similarly, there 
are a number of scholars that suggest this evidence is a product of tortured statistics 
and that real-world experience is being undervalued by the finance community. 
1.4 Operational Efficiency 
 Just as any investor would, activists expect firms to improve operations 
throughout their investment horizon. This leads to better utilization of assets, stronger 
profit generation and increased payouts. Historical research has utilized metrics such 
as, but not limited to, Tobin’s Q (Q) and Return on Assets (ROA) to assess operational 
efficiency. ROA analyzes the transformation of assets into profits while Q is designed to 
show how successful a company is in turning assets into shareholder value. Empirical 
data shows that when compared to size- and industry-matched peers, firms that 
experience an activist intervention typically outperform within two years. Although the 
outperformance comes in the form of underperforming less (i.e. becoming less negative) 
than before, firms do show operational improvements at the hands of activists 
(Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang 2015). These findings are replicated in multiple, dataset 
exclusive studies.  
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1.5 Corporate Strategy 
 Aside from firm performance, activists also directly impact the strategic vision at 
targeted firms. Activists tend to focus on takeover attempts (both internally and 
externally), asset divestitures, innovation rates and payout policies. Sometimes 
influence arises from an activist’s intention to take a seat on the board of 
representatives. If it’s a hostile campaign, activists employ what’s referred to as a 
“proxy fight” to obtain these seats. This sort of action tends to receive the most 
attention, and scrutiny, from the finance community. However, activists don’t 
necessarily need to have a seat at the table to influence firm behavior. They have the 
power to gain public interest by issuing public reports, called white papers, that outline 
the inefficiencies of management, contain previously private information and criticize 
recent developments within the firm. Research suggests that targeted firms are largely 
innovative, although inefficient in such a manner, and exhibit a higher probability of 
being taken over. There is little evidence proposing that activists are negatively 
impacting the corporate governance at targeted firms. The value creation, or 
destruction, in subsequent M&A activity is a topic yet to be quantified. 
2. Long-Term Shareholder Wealth 
2.1 The Myopic-Activist Claim 
 The myopic-activist claim states that activist demands, such as changes in capital 
structure, asset spinoffs and CEO replacements, sacrifice long-term value for short-term 
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returns to the activist. There have been a significant number of economists, legal 
scholars, and business professionals that have been outspoken about this claim. Unlike 
management teams and boards, activists can exit their investment whenever they 
please. This gives them an opportunity to invest, promote an agenda, realize a short-
term gain and exit immediately. They aren’t held to the same accountability standards 
as management and therefore aren’t responsible for the events subsequent their 
involvement. Thus, the activist has the opportunity to act in a unique environment. 
They suggest firm-wide actions that influence thousands of individuals, but can exit at 
their leisure irrespective of the outcomes of their agenda (Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang 
2015). This, the core of the myopic-activist claim, is supported by professional 
experience and simple logic. But what does the empirical evidence show? 
2.2 Initial Market Reaction 
 Research agrees that activist intervention results in an almost immediate increase 
to the targeted firm’s share price and subsequent cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). 
This market reaction is partially because of an increase in the demand for the stock and 
the simple buying function. But, more importantly, it is due to the perceived success of 
activist campaigns. Activists not only publicize their plans for value creation in targeted 
firms, but they also show commitment through the size of their investment. It’s quite 
possible that investors consider hedge funds to be superior monitors of corporate 
performance, leading them to overvalue the claims activists make (Clifford 2008). 
Investors observe this behavior and subsequently believe that the agenda will be 
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implemented, that it will create value and that they can ultimately realize abnormal 
returns. Thus, individual investors follow activists and exaggerate the positive price 
reaction. This behavior is analyzed across numerous event windows in multiple 
empirical studies. 
During the announcement window from 20 days before to 20 days after 
investment ([-20,+20] targeted firms experience positive excess returns of approximately 
7% to 8% (Brav, Jiang, Thomas and Partnoy 2008). These results are replicated in 
countries other than the United States. Across the same time period ([-20,+20]), 
successful activist campaigns result in abnormal returns of 8.77% and 2.72% in Europe 
and Asia respectively (Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner 2017). In a study of 980 events 
from 1992 to 2006 with an event window of [-10,+5 days], activist targets exhibit CARs 
of approximately 3.6% after starting at essentially zero (Schor and Greenwood 2009).  
These studies employ tactics to ensure the events being analyzed are, in fact, true 
activist campaigns. For example, Brav et al. (2015) conducts extensive research of news 
articles in search of language consistent with activist demands. This distinction is 
important as it allows for meaningful conclusions to be drawn. In a separate study of a 
5-day event window ([-2,+2]) comprised of 1,605 events, data shows that the mean 
return to targets of 13G (passive) investments is 1.6%. This is compared to abnormal 
returns in 13D (active) targets of approximately 3.4%. Thus, the market applies an alpha 
of almost 2% to companies that have been targeted by true activists (Clifford 2008).  
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2.3 Extended Abnormal Returns 
 The logical next step to the initial market reaction phenomenon is to then analyze 
how sustainable these CARs are in the long-term. A study comprised of 151 events over 
the years 2003 to 2005 suggests that abnormal returns do not retreat from their 
immediate spike. As compared to a Fama-French size-matched portfolio, targets that 
observe a successful activist campaign realize a mean abnormal return of 12.3% during 
the first year. Further, targets experience CARs of 10.2% when the activist gains a seat 
on the board and 14.7% when the target is acquired within one year (Klein and Zur 
2006). 
In a study of more than 2,000 interventions from 1994 to 2007, it is shown 
through regression analysis that targeted firms experience positive, statistically 
significant and extended CARs. In the three- and five-year periods post-intervention, 
targets exhibit alphas superior to the CAPM of 0.49% and 0.65% respectively. These 
positive returns are confirmed when using the Fama-French-Carhart model where 
across the same time horizons, targets have CARs of approximately 0.25% and 0.40% 
respectively. Additionally, the same sample is used to construct a buy-and-hold 
scenario in which returns in targeted firms are analyzed as compared to a market 
capitalization and book-to-market value-weighted portfolio. The mean abnormal return 
is 2.58% for the three-year period and 5.81% for the five-year period. Although the 
returns in the buy-and-hold scenario aren’t statistically significant at a positive level, 
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they also aren’t significant at a negative level. Thus, both analyses of CARs oppose the 
validity of the myopic-activist claim (Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang 2015). 
Therefore, empirical evidence provides no support for the myopic-activist claim. 
It is not shown that firms experience a degradation in long-term returns in lieu of short-
term gains. 
2.4 Reversion to the Mean 
 There is a subset of research suggesting that the abnormal returns observed by 
targeted firms is a product of selection bias. Said differently, activist hedge funds are 
good at “stock picking” firms that are already underperforming their peer group. Thus, 
the subsequent increase in abnormal returns is a mere function of reversion to the mean 
in a competitive market (Allaire and Dauphin 2014). 
 This selection bias is analyzed in a study using the same dataset as Brav et al. 
(2015), but with a few minor changes. Researchers utilize a different peer group than 
previous research as a way to improve the validity of the results. They use control 
firms, selected by the Abadia-Imbens matching estimator, that perform equally as 
poorly as the target in the year prior to intervention but are not a target for activist 
intervention. In this manner, they are able to study similarly-performing companies 
while isolating the impact of an activist shareholder. They find that control firms, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, experience an increase in value parallel to that of targeted 
firms. For example, in an analysis extending three years post-intervention, evidence 
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shows that the value of control firms was about 9.8% higher than that of targeted firms. 
This analysis proposes that the increase in value post-intervention is explained not by 
the activist, but by general forces present in a competitive market (Cremers, Giambona, 
Sepe and Wang 2015). 
 But, if hedge funds truly believe they are good stock pickers, as the previous 
paragraph predicts, then they wouldn’t willingly take on the costs associated with 
activist intervention. In using their resources to influence behavior, activists are 
exemplifying their belief that they can positively impact performance (Bebchuk, Brav 
and Jiang 2015). Similarly, firms targeted for activist reasons earn higher abnormal 
returns than firms that are passively targeted as shown in a study with the exact same 
sample group of hedge funds (Clifford 2008). These two pieces of research reject the 
reversion theory and suggest that there is a meaningful relationship, even in isolation, 
between activism and abnormal wealth creation. 
2.5 The Myopic-Activist Support 
 Advocates of the myopic-activist theory cite real-world experience, limitations of 
econometric models and value transfer as primary support. There is a large degree of 
manipulation in the statistics of most empirical studies. Size, industry, historical 
performance and expected growth are all variables that are frequently controlled in 
these studies. It is argued that these “tortured statistics” result in unrealistic outcomes 
when studied. For example in Bebchuk et al. (2015), the alphas for each group are 
compared to a dynamic, inconsistent peer group. Each year the benchmark portfolio is 
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adjusted to new firm attributes. Thus, each year of analysis is potentially being 
compared to a different set of benchmark firms (Allaire and Dauphin 2014).  
 Additionally, it’s important to understand the type of improvement targeted 
funds experience throughout an activist investment. Bebchuk et al. (2015) find that the 
three and five calendar year abnormal returns are statistically insignificant from zero as 
compared to the Fama-French-Carhart model. This means that an activist investor 
doesn’t obtain a return greater than that of the market portfolio during the same 
investment horizon. Therefore, a logical and efficient hedge fund will capitalize on the 
short-term gain and then immediately exit (Coffee and Palia 2014). This is precisely 
what the myopic-activist theory suggests comes as a result of shareholder activism.  
3. Operational Efficiency 
3.1 Target Characteristics 
 Data surrounding the initial state of operations in targeted companies is largely 
uncontested. Historical evidence proposed that activists tended to target smaller firms 
with exaggerated growth profiles and more debt than that of, for example, a private 
equity investor. Hedge fund targets have a median ROA of 3.3%, less than that of the 
sample of private equity targets (Mietzner and Schweizer 2007). However, a more 
recent analysis suggests the most successful activist hedge funds show an ability to 
succeed in difficult interventions with large, multinational firms. In a study conducted 
from 2008 to 2014, results show that top activists, defined as hedge funds with 21-day 
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post-announcement CARs of 10% and at least three interventions in the previous three 
years, target firms with an average ROA of 7%. This is compared to the mean of all 
other hedge fund groups’ average target ROA of -3% (Krishan, Partnoy and Thomas 
2016). Thus, one can conclude that the characteristics of targeted firms are changing 
drastically. 
3.2 Return on Assets (ROA) 
 Arguably the most recognizable measure of operating performance in financial 
economics literature is Return on Assets (ROA). ROA is commonly used to compare a 
firm’s profitability relative to its assets by dividing earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation & amortization (EBITDA) by total (or lagged) assets. Empirical studies, 
similar to those of wealth creation, suggest that activists have a statistically significant, 
positive impact on operational performance in targeted firms. 
 In Bebchuk et al. (2015), which utilizes a dataset of more than 2,000 interventions, 
it is shown that ROA steadily increases post-intervention. Excluding industry-related 
considerations, the sample set experiences an increase in raw ROA of more than 3%, 
from 2.6% to 5.7%, in the five years following an activist investment. In order to better 
control test results, results are typically shown on an industry-adjusted basis. Similar to 
the raw levels, industry-adjusted ROA in targeted firms increases more than 2% across 
the same time horizon. Although the targets tend to initially underperform relative to 
their peers (i.e. their industry-adjusted ROA is negative at t=0), the growth in ROA 
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exemplifies substantial increases in operating performance (Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang 
2015).  
In a different sample comprised of 418 activist events from 1994 to 2005, it is 
shown that targets interacting with an aggressive activist exhibit an increase in ROA of 
24.7% relative to matched peers. The year-over-year (YoY) increase in ROA of passive 
interventions is just 7.7%. This complimentary study suggests there is a tangible, 
isolated relationship between changes in firm performance and the degree of 
intervention that a targeted firm experiences (Boyson and Mooradian 2010). 
 But, where do these increases in ROA come from? ROA can increase due to an 
increase in EBITDA (numerator) or a decrease in total assets (denominator). In the year 
following activist intervention, both actively and passively targeted firms experience a 
reduction in EBITDA. This is complimented by evidence showing that actively targeted 
firms experience larger decreases in assets than that of passively targeted firms. With a 
consistent numerator, it can be concluded that increases in ROA in actively targeted 
firms is derived primarily from a reduction of assets (Clifford 2008). Hedge funds 
typically attempt to take value from the balance sheet by divesting underperforming 
assets, repurchasing significant numbers of shares and using “excess” cash to pay 
themselves a healthy dividend (Cheffins and Armour 2011). There is little research 
suggesting that increases in ROA are a result of an activist’s ability to increase firm 
profitability, as estimated by EBITDA.  
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3.3 Tobin’s Q (Q) 
 Less utilized in corporate environments, though used frequently by financial 
economists, is the performance metric known as Tobin’s Q (Q). Simply put, Q is a 
measure that represents a company’s success in turning assets into market value. A 
ratio greater than one (1) indicates that a firm is taking on positive Net Present Value 
(NPV) projects that meet or exceed expectations (Goodwin 2016). It’s calculated in the 
following manner: (market value of equity + book value of debt) / (book value of equity 
+ book value of debt). This metric can be used to analyze the effectiveness of firm 
operations relative to wealth creation, the efficiency of governance initiatives and the 
optimality of various debt and equity distributions (Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang 2015). 
 Parallel to the results stemming from the ROA analysis, Bebchuk et al. (2015) also 
provide evidence indicating that Q increases as a result of activist intervention. Q, 
without industry adjustments, increases from 2.011 to 2.150 in the five years after 
announcement in targeted firms. Similarly, industry-adjusted Q increases from -0.469 to 
-0.137. This is an increase of almost 67% relative to the industry average (Bebchuk, Brav 
and Jiang 2015). Operational improvement is replicated in an additional study with 
arguably the most exhaustive activist dataset to date. The sample comprised of 
approximately 4,186 events from between 1990 to 2014. The results indicate that 
industry-adjusted Q in targeted firms, specifically with board representation battles, 
increases from -1.47 to -1.20 in the [0,+5 year] event window (Goodwin 2016). However 
as previously discussed, these observations support the positive impact of shareholder 
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activism, but raise concern that a rational hedge fund would consistently act in such a 
manner. 
 In response to the reversion theory, which suggests increased firm performance 
following activist interventions is a natural path back to the industry standard, Bebchuk 
et al. (2015) took their analysis of Q one step further. In order to control against the 
explanation that increased firm performance is primarily due to the availability of 
improvement relative to a firm’s initial position, they add in a lagged performance 
variable. This way they can strictly analyze the impact of the activist shareholder 
without allowing for past performance metrics to skew the results. In this manner, Q is 
observed to increase to 0.44 five years post-intervention as compared to the year prior 
to intervention (Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang 2015).  
3.4 Earnings and Profitability 
 Operational efficiency in the form of increased profitability is scarce in the 
current academic research pool. Activists can more directly influence performance 
metrics relative to assets, along with other balance sheet items, because there are 
numerous ways to quickly change those accounts. It is much more difficult to obtain 
such results on the income statement. 
From 2003 to 2005 in an analysis of 151 targets, the change in the industry-
adjusted Cash /Assets ratio was -0.096. This indicates that the average cash balance of 
targets decreases throughout the [-30 day,+1 year] time horizon. To further this idea, the 
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same study also researched the post-intervention effects of activism on profitability. 
There is no meaningful increase in EBITDA and / or Cash Flow from Operations (CFO), 
both relative to assets, across the same event window (Klein and Zur 2006).  
Additional research shows that Operating Margin (OM), defined as EBITDA / 
Sales, exhibits an interesting trend in targets that elect an activist board member. In the 
window [-5,0 years], OM decreases more than 91% while in the post-intervention 
window ([0,+5]) OM increases approximately 363%. These metrics coincide with 
revenue trends of -54% from [-5,0] and 155% from [0,+5]. Because revenue increases at a 
slower rate than OM, it could be drawn that the increased OM is relative to something 
other than growth. Excluding the option that a firm drastically reduces operating 
expenses enough to make up for the gap, another explanation might be increased 
Capital Expenditures (CapEx). Targeted firms and industry-adjusted peers exhibit 
CapEx increases of almost 27% and 18% respectively for the event window [0,+5]. It’s 
possible that the increased cash used for CapEx is driving depreciation numbers higher 
in targeted firms, resulting in exaggerated EBITDA figures (Goodwin 2016).  
4. Corporate Strategy 
4.1 Governance 
 In many cases, activists aim to influence various corporate governance initiatives. 
These include, but are not limited to, items such as board representation, CEO removal 
and management transparency.  
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Historically, activists have received a lot of attention for their consistent 
involvement in proxy fights, or the solicitation of shareholder votes for a certain 
purpose. A study conducted in 2006 concludes that nearly 40% of activist events involve 
a threatened or actual proxy fight. This sample subsequently shows that CARs of hedge 
fund targets during the [-5,+5 day] event window are statistically significant at 4.48% 
(Klein and Zur 2006). Another way in which activists can influence firm behavior is 
through the formation of a “wolf pack”. This is a cohort of activists that, possibly by 
chance or by collusion, aim to influence management without surpassing the 13D 
threshold. This can prevent defense tactics such as a poison pill or a tender offer (Wong 
2016). 
The most recent wave of shareholder activism, coming after the financial crisis of 
2008, has brought a shift to the way in which firms succeed in such governance 
initiatives. Firms have been using their reputation, clout and expertise to win activist 
campaigns. The top activists are more effective in obtaining board representation, 
improving performance and monitoring strategy. These practices are starkly different 
from the old strategies of altering capital structure and increasing payouts. Interestingly 
enough, firms obtain the most respect through their “clout” as measured by the 
historical size of investments. The funds with the largest historical investments 
subsequently reap the highest abnormal returns post-announcement. In the [0,+21 day] 
event window, the top performing funds obtain an abnormal return of 12.4% as 
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compared to just 6.6% of all other funds in the study (Krishnan, Partnoy and Randall 
2016). 
Another type of intervention, dubbed offensive shareholder activism, supports 
corporate governance campaigns by shareholders. Offensive shareholder activism is 
defined as when a firm takes a significant, proactive stake on the assumption that a 
company is not currently maximizing value. These activists aim to promote change at 
the company in order to obtain the unrealized value (Cheffins and Armour 2011). This 
analysis is extended in an article which empirically studies the results of such 
interventions. As long as there is a framework in place to protect centralized authority 
and keep fiduciary responsibility with the board, offensive activism can be utilized as a 
corrective mechanism in reducing corporate error. Offensive shareholders, who are 
known to obtain superior information and strategies, are often given some of the 
authority in order to unlock value (Rose and Sharfman 2015). 
4.2 Innovation Rates 
The analysis of innovation in targeted firms is important for two main reasons. 
First, it’s vital to understand whether or not hedge fund activists are able to influence 
company growth at an organic level. Second, and more importantly, innovation projects 
typically have an extended time horizon with multiple facets of complex issues. This 
implies that the market typically won’t correctly value the activist impact on firm 
innovation. In such a manner, the myopic-activist claim would reject consistent activist 
involvement in such projects. This would incentivize the activist to take irrational 
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measures, such as drastically reducing R&D, in order to realize a short term profit. 
However, hedge funds have been shown to not act in this way and actually serve as 
more effective monitors of innovation that other institutions (He, Qiu and Tang 2016). 
Research conducted by He et al. (2016) concludes that, with respect to corporate 
innovation as an effective avenue for value creation, activists benefit innovative firms’ 
long-term performance. Because innovation is a costly, challenging and intense process, 
there are extensive opportunities for activists to enhance the results of such innovation. 
In deciding which innovative firms to target, hedge funds are more inclined to analyze 
the innovation efficiency (i.e. Sales per dollar of R&D) than the shear amount of input 
(R&D expense). Controlling for passive investments in order to mitigate the stock 
picking explanation, the data proposes that activists increase innovation output.   
 He et al. (2016) utilize the same dataset as Brav et al. (2008) to maintain the 
consistency of analysis. The input metric is a simple R&D margin to sales while the 
output is constructed as Patent Index / Sales (as obtained by the National Bureau of 
Economics Research). In the event window [0,+2 years], evidence suggests that activist 
interventions increase innovation output by 18.3%, significant at the 1% confidence 
level (He, Qiu and Tang 2016). 
4.3 Takeovers 
 The last, and arguably most important, strategic initiative that activist hedge 
funds influence is corporate takeovers. These pursuits are comprised of both internal, 
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go-private transactions as well as external M&A with strategic and financial buyers. 
Since the 1990s, there has been an increase in M&A activity parallel to a decline in 
corporate tender offers. Some point to the legal framework surrounding tender offers 
and suggest that activism has been made “easier” relative to such offers. Nonetheless, 
there is a possible connection between the increase in activist intervention and M&A 
activity (Burkart and Lee 2015). 
 As previously stated in this review, Schor and Greenwood (2009) find that 
targeted firms experience abnormal returns of about 3.5% in the [-10,+5 day] event 
window. They also find that in their dataset of 980 events from 1993 to 2006, the highest 
abnormal returns are observed, and statistically significant, when targeted firms are 
involved in M&A activity. It is shown that the majority of the 10% CAR in the event 
horizon of [-1, +18 month] comes during the [+3,+18] window. This suggests that either 
the market initially undervalues the activism, or the market systematically undervalues 
the target as a whole (Schor and Greenwood 2009). Therefore, if wealth creation and / 
or operational efficiency don’t drive the abnormal stock returns in targets, then it might 
be due to an expected takeover premium (Coffee and Palia 2014).  
 Numerous studies replicate this phenomenon of increased takeover returns 
across different sample pools. Brav et al. 2008 show that firms targeted for sale 
experience average positive CARs of 8.54%, significantly higher than that of their 
general target pool. Additionally, the target exhibits abnormal returns of 13.1% in 
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situations where the hedge fund intends to purchase the target for its own portfolio 
(Klein and Zur 2006).  
 Further, the takeover premium effect is compared directly to other forms of 
activist intervention. Schor and Greenwood (2009) outlay a table comprised of CARs 
under various activist demands. Takeover premiums apply primarily to asset sales, 
blocked mergers and strategic alternatives. Throughout the [-1,+18 month] window, as 
observed above, these demands result in excess, abnormal returns of 11.0%, 21.0% and 
8.1% respectively. For reference, capital structure demands only result in abnormal 
returns of 7.2% during the same event window.  
The information in the previous paragraphs summarize evidence suggesting that 
perceived takeover valuations are the significant driver, in excess of operational 
improvements, of abnormal returns (Coffee and Palia 2014). This inherently makes 
sense for two primary reasons. First, activists can exit at a premium to the perceived 
valuation of the target by the market. This is due to the premium that acquirer’s 
typically pay for control of the company and for any potential synergies. Second, 
activists can altogether avoid the issue of liquidity when exiting their investment. In the 
public market for a relatively illiquid firm, activists can experience downward price 
pressure when exiting the investment. It can be concluded that activists enjoy the 
abnormal returns stemming from takeover bids and therefore will advocate for such 
strategy at a firm-wide level.  
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
 This paper identifies, explains and analyzes multiple facets of the current 
shareholder activist landscape. 
 The evidence surrounding activist wealth creation is a mixed bag, but largely lies 
in opposition of the myopic-activist claim. Multiple studies have empirically confirmed, 
complete with statistically significant results, the positive short- and long-term wealth 
creation in targeted firms. The supporters of the myopic-activist theory primarily use 
qualitative, anecdotal evidence to back up its claims. While qualitative factors are 
undoubtedly important in analyzing the issue, the robustness of the presented 
empirical evidence greatly outweighs such alternative support. Thus, it should be 
concluded that activists do in fact generate shareholder wealth in targeted firms.  
 The majority of research supports the position that activists positively impact 
operational efficiency in targeted firms. When looking at metrics such as ROA and 
Tobin’s Q, one can make meaningful conclusions regarding their trends both prior to 
and in response of activist interventions. The data, however, becomes less clear when 
analyzing the subsequent impact on a firm’s profitability. It can be concluded that 
activist’s most effectively influence operational efficiency by increasing asset utilization 
in targets relative to their industry-matched peers. 
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 Activists aim to influence corporate strategy through practices such as, but not 
limited to, governance, innovation and takeovers. Research largely finds that activist 
interventions in each scope of strategy are beneficial to the target at a statistically 
significant level. In attempting to influence, not control, corporate governance, activists 
can help monitor and mitigate information asymmetry. Similarly, activists are 
empirically proven to improve the efficiency of innovation in targets. This type of 
organic growth can increase returns in the long-term. Lastly, activists are large 
supporters of takeovers post-intervention. This gives them the highest abnormal returns 
and facilitates a simple exit.  
 It’s no question that the results of activist interventions have far-reaching impact 
on investors of all kinds. For this reason it is important to analyze such practices 
objectively and accurately. The conclusion can be drawn from all sections of analysis 
that, on balance, activist hedge funds positively impact firms at a statistically significant 
level. Their intervention produces abnormal returns, increases operational efficiencies 
and promotes positive strategic initiatives. 
5.2 Next Steps 
 The current literature on hedge fund activism raises a significant question 
regarding the outcomes, to the acquirer, of activist-influenced M&A activity. 
 It is shown that targets of activism show a probability of takeover roughly six to 
eight times higher than that of firms where the same hedge fund is passive (Boyson, 
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Gantchev and Shivdasani 2017). Previous analysis shows positive returns to the activist, 
general shareholders and management. But, a vital point of discussion is overlooked 
throughout all previous research. 
 Are the deals that are ultimately consummated accretive to the Earnings Per 
Share (EPS) of the acquisitive firm? The goal, in theory, of M&A is to complete deals 
that will benefit both parties in the future. However, there is little evidence surrounding 
the subsequent integration of targeted firms. It’s vital to empirically analyze these 
transactions in order to determine whether activists truly are promoting valuable deals 
and not just simply creating an exit. 
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